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There is little doubt that foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an increasingly large role 
in the world economy. This rising importance has led to increased research into the policies that 
governments use to influence multinational enterprises (MNEs). Of these, taxation has received 
the bulk of the attention.1 Within this, there is a growing sub-literature on the effects of tax 
treaties on FDI.2 Although this literature’s theory generally presupposes that – in line with the 
OECD's (1997) model treaty – treaties are intended to increase FDI, the empirical work generally 
finds no evidence for this. Instead, researchers generally find either an insignificant or a weakly 
negative effect of treaty formation on FDI.3 This is often interpreted suggesting that the FDI-
increasing aspects of treaties (such as tax certainty or withholding tax reductions) balance against 
their FDI-reducing aspects (such as information exchange and added transfer pricing regulations) 
yielding a zero net effect of treaties on MNEs. 
This paper adds to this literature by utilizing firm-level data. This permits us to analyze 
both the level of FDI (measured by affiliate sales) as other papers do as well as several other 
dimensions of MNE behavior. In particular, we find that although there is no significant impact 
on the level of FDI (the intensive margin) when a tax treaty enters into force, it does increase the 
probability of investment in a country (the extensive margin),by 0.1%. Although small in 
absolute value, when one considers that the average probability of investment in our data is only 
0.6%, this effect becomes meaningful. Examination of the extensive margin is impossible using 
the country-level data employed in other studies. Furthermore, we consider whether the 
implementation of a treaty affects other aspects of a MNE’s behavior, specifically its exporting 
and importing activities. Using a simple model, we show that if a treaty affects the tax rate paid 
in the host, this may well affect the value of a subsidiary as a vertical affiliate (i.e. where output 
is exported back to the parent) or an export platform (where exports are sent to third countries).4 
Furthermore, this affects the incentive to import from the parent. Here, we find that although a 
treaty has no effect on exports to third countries, we do find significant effects on trade with the 
                                                 
1 See Wilson (1999), Gresik (2001), Gordon and Hines (2002), and Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2003) for recent 
surveys. 
2 Davies (2004) provides an overview of this literature. Note that we focus on bilateral tax treaties which differ from 
bilateral investment treaties. See Desbordes and Vicard (2007), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), and Hallward-
Driemeier (2003) for a discussion of bilateral investment treaties. 
3 Examples include and Louie and Rousslang (2007), Millimet and Kumas (2007), Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr, and 
Winner (2006), di Giovanni (2005), Blonigen and Davies (2004a, 2004b), and Davies (2003). 
4 Helpman (1984) provides an early discussion of vertical MNEs. Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (forthcoming) 
provide a theoretic treatment of export-platform FDI. Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2007) and Baltagi, 
Egger, and Pfaffermayr (forthcoming) provide evidence for this type of MNE structure.  
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parent. Specifically, exports to the parent fall while imports of intermediate goods from the 
parent rise. In particular, these effects are most significant for affiliates that trade little relative to 
the size of their overall sales. These changes are all consistent with a treaty increasing the 
effective host tax, leading the MNE to change trade behavior to minimize tax liabilities. Again, 
study of the issue is made possible by our use of firm-level data. Thus, our study broadens the 
empirical research on tax treaties by examining several heretofore unexplored facets of MNE 
behavior. 
To put our results in context, it is useful to review the purposes of tax treaties. As 
discussed by Blonigen and Davies (2004b), tax treaties play four major roles, two of which are 
likely to increase FDI and two of which tend to reduce it. First, tax treaties standardize tax 
definitions and jurisdictions. Janeba (1996) theoretically shows that such coordination can reduce 
the double taxation of affiliate income. Second, tax treaties affect the taxation of MNEs by 
lowering withholding taxes and increasing tax certainty. In particular, Edmiston, Mudd, and 
Valev (2003) find that uncertainty over tax policy is a significant barrier to FDI. Thus, if a tax 
treaty reduces the likelihood of a host nation unilaterally changing its tax policy, this added 
certainty would increase FDI. Combined, these two roles of treaties increase the expected value 
of after-tax returns from FDI leading one to expect that the introduction of a treaty should 
increase FDI. 
 These FDI-increasing aspects of treaties are however at least partially offset by two FDI-
reducing roles of treaties. The first of these is increased enforcement of transfer pricing 
regulation. This occurs by the introduction of additional regulations on the calculation of internal 
prices, establishing guidelines for resolving disputes between taxation authorities, and 
encouraging the exchange of information between authorities.5 Second, treaties often establish 
anti-treaty shopping provisions that inhibit the ability to funnel profits through low-tax treaty 
partners in order to minimize tax payments.6 Since these increase the taxation of affiliate income 
in a given host, they would lead one to anticipate that a tax treaty might reduce FDI. 
 Given the conflicting directions of these effects, which effects dominate becomes an 
empirical question. Blonigen and Davies (2004a, 2004b) represent the first attempts to estimate 
the impact of tax treaties on FDI. Respectively using panel data on OECD FDI (where FDI is 
                                                 
5 See Ligthart and Keen (2006) for a recent overview of the work on information exchange.  
6 See Davies (2004) for a discussion on treaty shopping. 
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measured as stocks) and US FDI (where it is measured as stocks or sales), these papers find that 
after controlling for country fixed effects there is either a small negative or insignificant effect of 
treaty formation on FDI. Davies (2003) finds a similar result for the renegotiation of a pre-
existing treaty. In a similar fashion, Louie and Rousslang (2007) are able to eliminate the 
significance of treaties for the rate of return of an affiliate by including proxies for host country 
governance and political stability. Instead of investigating overall FDI, Di Giovanni (2005) 
utilizes panel data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions yet still finds no effect from treaty 
formation.  
Two other papers, however, find significantly negative effects of treaty formation. Egger, 
Larch, Pfaffermayr, and Winner (2006), who control for the endogenous selection of which 
treaties are actually formed, find that treaties significantly reduce FDI stocks. Finally, Millimet 
and Kumas (2007) use a quantile treatment effects approach to the data of Blonigen and Davies 
(2004b) and find that although there is a slight positive effect when FDI levels are initially small, 
they are significantly negative in the upper quantiles of the FDI distribution. They therefore 
conclude that the use of a specification imposing a common coefficient on the treaty variable 
across all observations misses key information but that for the majority of FDI, treaties reduce 
investment. 
 Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence thus indicates that if anything the FDI-deterrent 
aspects of treaty formation win out. Our empirical work expands on this by utilizing affiliate-
level data from Swedish-owned multinationals from 1965 to 1998. To our knowledge, this is the 
first time such micro-level data have been used. In line with earlier studies, we find no 
significant effect from treaty formation on the level of affiliate sales (the same measure of FDI 
used by Blonigen and Davies (2004b), Davies (2003), and Millimet and Kumas (2007)). 
Furthermore, unlike other studies, the micro nature of our data allows us to investigate the effect 
of a treaty on the probability an affiliate exists in a particular host country. Here we do find a 
positive impact of treaty formation on the probability of the existence of a subsidiary. Combining 
these results suggests that even if a treaty does not affect the desired size of investment, it can 
affect the attractiveness of one host country over another. This might be the case if MNEs are 
assured by the tax certainty that a treaty creates for even if this does not affect the marginal 
decisions of a firm after entering, it reduces the overall risk of entry. 
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We then go on to show to investigate the impacts of treaty formation on the composition 
of affiliate sales, i.e. whether affiliate sales are generated within the host or from exports. On the 
whole, we find little impact of treaties on the platform export behavior of MNEs. There are 
however significant changes in trade between the affiliate and the parent country (Sweden). 
Thus, our results combine to suggest that although treaties may reduce the perceived risk of 
entry, they nevertheless give a MNE cause to restructure trade flows to reduce the profitability of 
the affiliate relative to the parent. This result is most clear for vertical activities and for MNEs 
where the affiliate trade levels are fairly low. Therefore, to the extent that treaty formation is 
costly, this is best weighed against the value generated by new affiliate creation rather than 
increases in the tax base of inbound MNEs. 
The closest antecedent to our results is Clausing (2003). In that paper, she considers 
intrafirm trade as it depends on the host tax using two types of country-level data on US-owned 
MNEs. First, using data on affiliate imports from the US and exports to the US, she calculates 
the trade balance for intrafirm trade flows and finds that the trade balance is smallest between the 
US and low-tax countries. This suggests that US-owned affiliates in low-tax host nations import 
less from and export more to their US parents. Second, she calculates the sales of the affiliates in 
a given host to other foreign affiliates finding that this is smallest for high-tax host countries. 
This is comparable to our results for the host tax which indicate that exports both overall and to 
third nations fall in the host tax. She, however, does not use actual affiliate level data as we do 
nor does she not consider the impact of tax treaties. Thus our results add to hers by utilizing 
affiliate level data (potentially avoiding the problems created by aggregating across firms), by 
analyzing the impact of tax treaties on affiliate trade, and by considering the behavior of non-US 
owned MNEs. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of the MNE in 
order to demonstrate why a treaty could affect affiliate exports. Section 3 describes the data we 
use in our analysis and describes our empirical specification. Section 4 presents our results on 
investment decision, the levels of affiliate activity and the composition of those activities. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. A Model of Tax Treaties and Affiliate Trade 
 To illustrate how the introduction of a tax treaty can affect affiliate sales and trade, this 
section presents a simple model of a MNE. This firm produces in two countries, the parent 
country (Sweden in our data) and a host country. Note that we take investment as a given and do 
not model the extensive margin. It sells its output in the host and in a third market. We 
characterize the non-host sales as taking place in a third market in order to streamline the 
discussion. Nevertheless this is not necessary as these sales can take place at home or in both the 
home country and a third market with similar results. In fact, our empirical investigation 
examines precisely whether a treaty changes exports back to the parent or exports to third 
countries.7  Production in the parent is X . For simplicity, we assume that all of this is exported. 
Production in the host is the sum of l , which is sold locally, and x , which is sold in the third 
market. The demand curve in the host is: 
 .5p a bl= −  (1) 
while that in the third market is: 
 ( ).5P A B X x= − + . (2) 
The cost of parent production is ( )C X  while that in the host is ( )c l x+ . Both of these functions 
are increasing and convex. For simplicity we assume no trade costs. In addition to these variable 
costs, the firm faces parent and host fixed costs of F  and f  respectively. Finally, the firm pays 
an average effective profit tax T  on its parental profits and an average effective profit tax t  on 
its host profits.8 This latter tax rate is affected by the introduction of a tax treaty due to the 
impact of a treaty. To streamline discussion and in line with previous results on the level of FDI, 
we assume that the introduction of a tax treaty increases the effective host tax. However, this is 
merely for expositional purposes. 
                                                 
7 Several other papers model the choice between importing from the parent or using local production to service the 
host market. Clausing (2003) models an affiliate that imports final goods from the parent for sale in the host. More 
complicated versions, such as Madan (2000), allow for imports of intermediates and /or final goods production from 
the parent. The standard result from these models is that an increase in the host tax replaces local production with 
home production. Madan (2000) shows that there can still, however, be a rise in host sales depending on the 
assumptions regarding transfer pricing.  
8 This host tax rate could well depend on the home tax rate in the case of foreign tax credits with a relatively high-
home tax. However, since our purpose is to show how changes in the relative tax rate of host profits affects 
subsidiary export behavior, detailed modeling of this is not necessary. It is worth noting, however, that Sweden 
utilizes foreign tax credits. 
  6
 In addition to its real activities, the firm can “import” from its parent. For simplicity, we 
simply model this as a tax avoidance measure, i.e. a transfer of an amount of income I  out of the 
host into the parent. This is done at an increasing, convex cost of ( )E I .9 These costs are assumed 
to be deducted from the host profits and could represent both actual importation costs (such as of 
intermediate inputs) or the costs of restructuring cash flows within the firm to reduce tax 
liability. 
 The firm's worldwide profit is:  
 ( )( ) ( )( )1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( )T PX C X F I t Px pl c l x f I E Iπ = − − − + + − + − + − − − . (3) 
From (3), the equilibrium conditions for parent exports, host exports, local sales, and imports are 
(dropping the arguments of the cost functions): 
 ( )( ) ( )1 .5 1 .5 0T A BX Bx C t Bx′− − − − − − = , (4) 
 ( )( ) ( )1 .5 1 .5 0t A Bx BX c T BX′− − − − − − = , (5) 
 0a bl c′− − = , (6) 
and 
 ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 0T t E′− − − + = .   (7) 
 
We assume that parameter values are such that corner solutions are avoided. From these four 
conditions, we can derive the following results. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that a tax treaty increases the effective host tax. Then the introduction of 
a treaty will raise lower affiliate exports and raise parent production, local affiliate sales, and 
imports. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 We could model this as a function of the absolute value of I thereby implicitly allowing for transfers in either 
direction. However, given our empirical findings and to simplify the presentation, we assume that the transfer is out 
of the host into the parent. While this requires that t T> , recall that this is the effective tax rate and therefore does 
not correspond directly to the statutory rate since it also includes factors such as other local taxes, risk, and so on 
that lead a firm to shift profits back to its parent. 
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Proof: By direct calculation: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1.5 1 1 .5 1 1 0dx B b c T t B C X B T t xdt −⎡ ⎤′′ ′′= Δ + − − + + − + − <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (8) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2.5 1 1 1 1 1 .5 0dX B t Bb b B c x T t t T B b c Xdt −⎡ ⎤′′ ′′= −Δ − + + + − + − − − + >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (9) 
and 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1.5 1 1 .5 1 1 0dl Bc T t B C X B T t xdt −⎡ ⎤′′ ′′= −Δ − − + + − + − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  (10) 
and 
 ( )( ) 2 11 1 0dI T t E
dt
− −′′= − − >  (11) 
 
where 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ){ }21 2 21 1 .25 1 1 1 1 0.T t B C c b c T t B T t B C B c− ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′Δ ≡ − − + + + − + − − − − + + <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
            Q.E.D. 
The intuition for these results is straightforward. When the tax rate on host profits 
increases, the MNE reduces host exports and replaces them with parent exports.10 This decline in 
host exports redirects some of this production to the local host market. Thus, the imposition of a 
tax treaty that increases the effective host tax rate due to information sharing and limits on treaty 
shopping (both of which are reductions in the firm's ability to shield profits from taxation) 
reorients the affiliate's production towards its local market. Finally, the increase in the effective 
host tax encourages the firm to shift profits from the affiliate to the parent through increased 
imports. 
 In order to tie this result into the empirical work on tax treaties, however, it is necessary 
to translate from quantities of affiliate output ( l  and x ) into values ( Px  and pl ). Looking at the 
value of affiliate exports, we see that (using  (5)): 
 ( )( )( )11 1 .5 .5 0dPx dx dXT t BX c Bxdt dt dt− ′= − − + − <  (12) 
                                                 
10 If on the other hand, a treaty lowers the effective host tax, then parent exports fall and host production and exports 
rise. 
  8
thus, the value of affiliate exports falls as the host tax rises. Turning to the value of affiliate sales, 
we see that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )( )
2 1
1
.5 1 1 .5 1 1
1 1 .5 .5 0
d pl Px
c Bb T t B C X B T t x
dt
dx dXT t BX Bx
dt dt
−
−
+ ⎡ ⎤′ ′′= Δ − − + + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ − − − <
 (13) 
indicating that a rise in the host tax reduces the total revenue generated by the affiliate. If a tax 
treaty raises the average effective tax in a host country, then this would be one explanation for 
the negative effect sometimes found from a tax treaty on affiliate sales (e.g. Blonigen and 
Davies, 2004). Note that by combining (12) and (13), it is easy to show that the fall in total 
affiliate sales is greater than the fall in exports, thus the export share (i.e. exports divided by total 
affiliate sales) falls with the treaty. Finally, since imports rise as affiliate sales fall, the import 
share rises with the treaty. These results are summarized in Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2: Suppose that a tax treaty increases the effective host tax. Then the introduction of 
a treaty will lower the share of affiliate exports in total affiliate sales and raise the share of 
imports in total affiliate sales. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Approach 
 In this section, we begin by describing the source of our firm level data and Swedish tax 
treaties. This is followed by a description of the empirical specifications and data we use to study 
the various aspects of MNE behavior.  
 
3.1 The RIIE Survey on the Foreign Activities of Swedish Multinationals 
To examine the effect of tax-treaties on FDI we use unique micro data on affiliates to 
Swedish Multinational firms. This section briefly describes these data. 
 Our data comes from the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IfN) which has 
conducted eight surveys of the foreign activities of Swedish Multinational firms in the years 
1965, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998.11 The purpose of the surveys has been to 
study all Swedish firms meeting the following criteria: (i) the firm’s main activity should be 
                                                 
11 There was also a survey in 2003, however, given the considerable fall in the answering rate we only use the data 
from 1965 to 1998.   
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within the manufacturing sector, (ii) the total number of employees should be at least 50, and (iii) 
the firm should have at least one producing affiliate abroad and the domicile be located in 
Sweden. To gain an appreciation for the coverage of the surveys, consider Table 1 which reviews 
the number of firms and affiliates taking part of the survey. As can be seen, the answering rate is 
very high both among firms and their affiliates. There is a slight decline in 1998 but the 
answering rate is still high, almost 80 percent.   
 These Swedish multinationals also accounted for a large share of Swedish manufacturing 
activity. In 1990 MNEs accounted for more than 50 percent of Swedish exports, about 25 percent 
of Swedish total manufacturing employment and roughly 90 percent of R&D expenditures 
(Svensson, 1996).  The importance of their foreign activities has also increased As Figure 1 
illustrates, overseas employment by Swedish MNE’s increased from slightly above 30% in 1965 
to almost 70% in 1998. 
 A great advantage of our data on affiliate activities is that intra-firm trade can be studied.  
For example, as Figure 2 illustrates, we can decompose affiliate total sales in several ways, such 
as into goods assembled at the affiliate (i.e. production) and sales not assembled by the affiliate 
(i.e. direct sales).  A further distinction can be made between sales for exports and sales for the 
local market.  Exports, in turn, can be broken up into sales to Sweden and those to other 
countries than Sweden, e.g. platform exports.  We can also decompose imports into imports for 
further procession. i.e. inputs, and finished goods for resale.   
Figures 3 through 6 decompose our data on intra-firm trade in these ways. Figure 3 shows 
the decomposition of total affiliate sales into goods assembled in the affiliate and goods simply 
imported for resale. As we can see, production activities dominate with over 75 percent of sales 
originating from assembly, a pattern that is quite stable over time. The destination of these sales, 
however, has experienced change. In Figure 4, there is a clear pattern that affiliates over time are 
becoming more export oriented. This mirrors globalization and highlights the increasing 
importance of intra-firm trade. Looking at the destination of these exports in Figure 5, we see 
that the increasing export intensity of affiliates is driven by exports to other countries to Sweden. 
This is perhaps not surprising given that Sweden is a small home market. Finally, Figure 6 turns 
to the data on imports from Sweden. As this figure shows, relative to affiliate sales, imports of 
both final and intermediate goods have fallen. For example, in 1965 about 10 percent of affiliate 
sales was direct sales of products assembled in Sweden but by 1998 this share had shrunk to half 
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that. Prior to 1990, imports of intermediate inputs from Sweden had a comparable trend, 
although they have since rebounded to their initial level. 
 
3.2 Tax Treaties 
Let us now turn to which host countries entered into tax treaties with Sweden during the 
sample period. Table 2 gives a list of these countries and the year in which the treaty became 
effective12, 13. To indicate the extent of Swedish FDI into these countries we also give the number 
of firms investing in each country, the number of affiliates, and total affiliate employment.  
Comparing the total number of employees abroad in Table 1 with that in new treaty countries 
from Table 2, we note that in 1998 about 13 percent of foreign employment was located in the 
new treaty countries. 
Sweden has concluded tax treaties with a large number of countries over the years, most 
of which follow the OECD model treaty. By 2007, Sweden had tax treaties with all its major 
trade partners. Under most Swedish treaties, dividends from a foreign subsidiary are held exempt 
from Swedish tax to the same extent as if the subsidiary had been located in Sweden. Swedish 
tax treaties most commonly use the method of credit to avoid double taxation. Credit is 
calculated according to the internal law, which provides a generally favorable foreign tax credit 
rule overall. However, if a treaty grants a higher tax reduction than the internal law, the treaty 
overrides. A common alternative is the exemption method, which is often provided in a treaty for 
certain income, even if credit is the main method. The tax treaties also ensure that the authorities 
of the two countries will exchange information that is relevant to an application of the treaty or 
to put a stop to fraud or tax evasion. As discussed above, this latter provision may be an 
important facet of a treaty since it may reduce the incentive to use an affiliate as an export 
platform. 
Since our data runs from 1965 and 1998, we limit the sample to the set of countries with 
which a tax treaty with Sweden became effective during this period to ensure that we have 
information on both the pre- and post-treaty period. This leaves us with 27 countries which, with 
                                                 
12 We refer to these countries as “new treaty countries” to distinguish them from countries that had treaties in place 
before 1965. Note that since our data analysis uses country fixed effects, we restrict our sample to these new treaty 
countries as they are the only ones with time-series variation in the variable of interest. 
13 For a treaty to become effective, the Swedish government must first sign it and then the treaty must be approved 
by the Swedish parliament must pass it into law. A comparable process is common for most other countries. 
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the exceptions of Australia and Luxembourg, are developing countries. The data come from the 
Worldwide Tax Treaties database at Tax.com (2007). 
 
3.3 Empirical Approach 
In our empirical analysis, we wish to investigate three items: the probability of 
investment, the level of investment and trade, and the share of imports or exports in affiliate 
sales. Here we present our baseline specifications. 
 We start our investigation by estimating the effect of a tax treaty on the probability that 
an affiliate exists in a particular host country. Although our model took investment in the host as 
given, it is certainly possible that even if a treaty does not affect behavior conditional on entry it 
affects the probability of investment. While the effects of tax rate on the investment decision 
have been considered in a number of papers, including Head and Mayer (2004) which uses firm 
level data, to our knowledge this is the first time the effects of tax treaties on the extensive 
margin have been investigated.  
To this end, we consider binary variable Affiliate,i,j,t which is equal to one if the Swedish 
firm i, has established a new affiliate in the host country j in year t and zero otherwise. This is 
regressed on our variable of interest, a dummy variable TREATYj,t which is equal to one if there 
is an effective tax treaty between Sweden and country j in year t and other covariates drawn from 
the previous MNE literature on first time entry14. This yields the specification:  
 
 , , , , , , , ,i j t j t i j t j i t t i j tAffiliate TREATY X Country Ind Yearβ γ η δ ε= + + + + +  (14) 
 
where Xi,j,t are the additional regressors, some of which are country- or firm-specific, and , ,i j tε  is 
the error term. In all of our results, we utilize country, industry, and year dummies ( jCountry , 
,i tInd , and tYear  respectively). Note that the use of country dummies eliminates the need for 
controls such as distance between country j and Sweden. 
                                                 
14 See Blonigen (1997), Norbäck (2001), Yeaple (2005) and Tekin-Koru (2006) for example. 
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We then follow this by analyzing the impact of treaties on the level of economic activity 
by affiliates of firm i in a country j in year t.15 Here we use: 
 
 , , , , , , , ,i j t j t i j t j i t t i j tLevel TREATY X Country Ind Yearβ γ η δ ε= + + + + + . (15) 
  
We consider several level choices: total sales, sales from local production, sales from resale of 
imported final goods, local sales, exports, exports to third countries (platform), exports back to 
Sweden (vertical), total imports, imports of intermediate goods from the parent, and imports of 
final goods from the parent.  
 Finally, we turn to share regressions, using the specification:  
 
 , , , , , , , ,i j t j t i j t j i t t i j tShare TREATY X Country Ind Yearβ γ η δ ε= + + + + +  (16) 
 
Here, we consider the share of the various measures of exports and imports relative to total 
affiliate sales to understand how the orientation of an affiliate might vary with the existence of a 
treaty. Norbäck et al. (2007) show that using shares as the empirical measure excludes the effects 
of the change in the product variety within an existing affiliate and other omitted affiliate–
specific variables which are time invariant. Thus, these results may be more robust than our level 
results.  
The country level controls in our analysis originate from the standard gravity framework 
and our sign expectations for these variables come from that framework.16 Note that since we use 
year dummies in our specification, we do not include information on the source country 
(Sweden) since it does not vary across firms. We proxy the host country market size by real 
gross domestic product (GDPj,t) of country j in year t.17 We control for trade barriers by using 
various dummy variables that indicate whether a country belong to a regional trade agreement 
(ASEANj,t, CACMj,t, CEFTAj,t, EUj,t, MERCOSURj,t and NAFTAj,t which we collectively refer to 
as RTA dummies) and by the host country openness measure (OPENj,t) which is the ratio of 
                                                 
15 Note that we are not explicitly conditioning on the entry decision in these results and therefore acknowledge that 
the results must be interpreted as conditional on there being affiliates in that country in that year for a given firm. 
16 See Blonigen (2005) for a recent overview. 
17 In unreported results, we used the foreign market potential variable of Hanson (1998) which is the distance-
weighted sum of GDP. This is intended to capture third-country effects. This was not significant in our results and 
was therefore omitted from the presented specification. 
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exports plus imports per nominal GDP. The labor costs in the host country are picked up by GDP 
per capita (GDPCAPj,t). Note that this also captures the level of development of the host country. 
Thus, while one might expect FDI to be deterred by costly workers, it may also be attracted by 
wealthy consumers or highly skilled workers. Thus, the anticipated effect of this variable is 
ambiguous. The country level data used in this paper come from the Penn World Tables18.  
An additional important control variable we use is the tax rate (TAXj,t). We employ the 
highest tax bracket of corporate income taxes reported in the World Tax Database of the Office 
of Tax Policy Research in University of Michigan. It is generally accepted that international tax 
rules and the tax rates of other countries can affect a broad range of corporate and individual 
behavior, including, the location and scope of foreign direct investment19. Therefore, we expect a 
negative sign for the TAX in our estimations. 
Turning to firm-level variables, we include a measure of fixed costs in terms of plant 
scale (SCALEi,t). This covariate is characterized as the average number of employees in Swedish 
plants with more than 200 employees in the 4 digit industry level to which the affiliate belongs in 
the period under consideration. The data come from the Statistics Sweden. We expect a negative 
influence of SCALE on the probability of new investments but no effect on the level of FDI and 
share of trade equations. We use total sales of the group, FSIZEj,t as an indicator of the size of the 
MNE and its experience abroad. The expected sign of this covariate is positive. We proxy firm 
specific assets by the research and development intensity (R&Dj,t) of the mother firm. It is 
calculated as the share of total expenditure on R&D in sales. This variable’s effect on the 
probability, the size and the composition of FDI is ambiguous20. The knowledge of local 
business conditions is picked up by the previous experience (EXPERIENCEj,t) in the host 
country. This is a dummy variable which takes value one if the Swedish MNE had an affiliate in 
this country before and zero otherwise. Previous experience is expected to positively affect the 
                                                 
18 See Summers and Heston (1991) for details.  
19 See, for example, Hines (1999) who offers a survey of this literature.  Altshuler et al. (2001) and Hines (2001) are 
recent examples of this work.  
20 If the MNE enters by using greenfield investments, R&D is expected to have a positive effect on the probability of 
investment due to internalization reasons. If the MNE uses mergers and acquisitions, then this variable might not 
have any effect on the entry probability. See Tekin-Koru (2006) for discussion. The effect of R&D on the 
composition of sales is also multi-faceted. For example, as the level of R&D intensity goes up, we expect an 
increase in the imports of finished goods from the parent for resale in the host country. On the other hand, an R&D 
intensive firm will produce the high-tech components at headquarters and ship them to the affiliate for assembly. In 
this case, we expect a positive effect both on intermediate goods imports and total exports if the host country is used 
as an export platform.  
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entry probability but not the level or the composition of sales. Another variable that we use to 
control for the local conditions is the age (AGEj,t) of the affiliate under consideration. AGE is 
calculated by subtracting the year of establishment from the current year and it is expected to 
positively affect the level of activity. Finally, we use a dummy variable (PRODAFFj,t) to proxy 
the purpose of establishment. It takes value one if the affiliate was established as a sales-
company and value zero if it is established as a production unit. Note that this variable seems to 
indicate that the affiliate is more directed towards local sales. This variable is important because 
it gives us information on the initial intent of the mother firm. The interpretation of the sign of 
this variable will closely hinge on the signs of other covariates. In our estimations we also use 
the OECD taxonomy of industries (Resource Intensive, Labor Intensive, Scale Intensive, 
Differentiated Goods and Science Based) to account for the industry specific effects that we 
cannot observe in our data. It is important to note that these do change for an affiliate over time.  
Table 3 gives descriptive information on all the covariates discussed in this section. From 
these baseline specifications, we utilize various alternatives, including the use of industry 
dummy variables, firm dummy variables, and interaction terms. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Investment Decision 
We begin with the extensive margin estimations. Table 4 presents the probit estimates of 
treaty effects on new entry by Swedish multinationals. Column (1) is our base specification with 
country fixed effects. Columns (2) and (3) include firm and more detailed industry fixed effects 
(defined up to the five digit level), respectively. All regressions include region and time 
dummies. The Pseudo R2 is between 0.49 and 0.54 in Table 4, indicating a relatively good fit.  
 TREATY is significant and positive in all specifications in Table 4, revealing that bilateral 
tax treaties increase the likelihood of new investments by Swedish multinational corporations.  
This significant treaty effect is a new result. Previously in the literature, researchers generally 
find either an insignificant or a weakly negative effect of the treaty formation on the level of FDI 
using aggregate data21. Here, we show that tax treaties have a favorable effect on the probability 
of new investments. This might be the case if the MNEs are convinced about the tax certainty 
provided by the treaty.  .Nevertheless, the economic size of this effect is very small. Calculating 
                                                 
21 See Davies (2004) for a recent review of this literature. 
  15
the marginal effect shows that if a host county signs a treaty with Sweden this increases the 
probability that a Swedish firm will invest by 0.1%. Although this is small in absolute 
magnitude, compared to the probability evaluated at the sample mean of .6%, this is nevertheless 
economically meaningful. 
TAX is insignificant across all the specifications, pointing out no effect of host country 
tax rates on the probability that a new affiliate is established. This supports the findings of the 
previous literature when country fixed effects are included (e.g. Head and Mayer, 2004).  
Looking at the probit estimations in column (1) to (3) of Table 4, a larger market size 
(GDP), a larger firm size (FSIZE) and previous experience (EXPERIENCE) in the host country 
increase the likelihood of new entry as expected. The regression with firm fixed effects in 
column (2) results in a higher number of significant covariates. GDPCAP is not significant, 
perhaps due to its proxying for both the skill and the cost of workers. SCALE, which is used to 
control for the fixed costs of new investments is also insignificant. This might be due to the 
elusiveness of this variable as a proxy for the fixed costs.  
Many of the industry dummies are significant in the regression with firm fixed effects. 
There is more entry in the labor, scale and differentiated goods intensive sectors. Entry in the 
science intensive sector is less common, although the coefficient is insignificant. We expected a 
decline in the likelihood of entry when the firm has a high research and development intensity 
due to the risk of losing the new technology. 
 
4.2. Compositional Effects 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the data allows us to make a detailed decomposition of affiliate 
sales. We therefore turn to the estimation of the compositional effects of tax treaties to test the 
predictions summarized in Proposition 1. Table 5 reports the OLS estimates of treaty effects on 
the level of sales, exports, and imports of the Swedish affiliates, both for their total values as well 
as the value of their various components22.  
                                                 
22 It is possible that the existence of a treaty with the parent country is endogenous. Egger, Larch and Pfaffermayr 
(2006) and Millimet and Kumas (2007) are two recent papers which explicitly treat the tax treaty endogeneity. We 
use OLS in our estimates because, for endogeneity to be a problem in our data, the existence of a treaty would need 
to depend on the sales or overall exports (imports) of a single affiliate. We do not feel that this is likely. 
Nevertheless, in unreported IV estimations with credit regulations in the host country as our instrument for a treaty, 
we find out that our results do not change qualitatively. These results are available upon request. 
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Our variable of interest, TREATY is slightly negative although insignificant in column (1) 
of Table 5. This confirms the previous empirical result that tax treaties do not significantly affect 
the level of FDI (measured by affiliate sales) by using micro data. Even though bilateral tax 
treaties positively affect the probability of new investments, they have no aggregate or “total” 
effect on the level of FDI by a firm. This suggests that treaties may not affect a firm’s marginal 
FDI decision even if they affect the extensive margin of a firm. 
Next, we decompose the total sales of an affiliate into different categories. The first 
breakdown is to decompose total sales into those generated by local production and those from 
resale of imported goods. The second separates total sales into those generated by local sales and 
those from exports. Exports themselves can be broken down into platform sales (those to third 
countries) and vertical sales (those to Sweden). Finally, we can consider total imports or their 
two components, intermediate good imports and finished good imports. Thus, by breaking the 
affiliate data into these various components one gets a clear overview of the total effect and the 
compositional effect.  
Columns (2) and (3) report the estimation results for the sales of goods produced by the 
affiliate and the resale of finished goods imported from elsewhere. TREATY has an insignificant 
negative (positive) effect on the former (latter). Columns (4) and (5) show local sales and total 
exports. TREATY has an insignificant negative effect on total exports and yet again insignificant 
but positive effect on local sales. TAX has similar insignificant coefficients. Columns (6) and (7) 
report the results for platform and vertical exports. TREATY has an insignificant negative effect 
on platform exports. In other words, exports to third countries do not change after the treaty. 
Vertical exports, on the other hand, has a weakly significant negative coefficient suggesting a 
decline in exports back to home country after the treaty goes into effect. This result might be 
interpreted such that the treaty increases the average effective tax in the host country and the 
MNE shifts away from this affiliate as a way of servicing the home market as discussed in 
Proposition 1. 
Columns (8), (9) and (10) present results for the total imports and the composition of 
imports as intermediate and finished goods. TREATY affects all of them positively; however, it is 
only significant for the level of total imports. As shown in the model, if the introduction of a 
treaty increases the effective tax rate, this would encourage shifting profits out of the host. One 
way to achieve this is to import more. Thus, in line with the vertical export result, this is 
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somewhat suggestive of a treaty increasing the effective host tax.  However, the estimated 
increase is an astounding 11 fold rise and therefore there is reason to be suspect of attributing 
this estimated effect to treaty formation alone.  
In unreported results, we also considered the interaction between TREATY and TAX. 
Some of the previous literature finds a weakly negative effect of tax treaties on FDI (suggesting 
transfer pricing), one might expect this effect to be stronger when the affiliate is in a low tax 
location. We did not find any robust effect of the interaction variable. Although we omitted these 
results for brevity, they are available upon request.23  
Most of the other covariates exhibit their expected signs, though some are insignificant. 
Throughout almost all equations AGE, FSIZE and PRODAFF have significant positive signs, 
pointing out that Swedish MNEs with more foreign market experience, bigger size and were 
established as sales affiliates have higher levels of sales, exports and imports. In short, the degree 
of multinationality matters. GDPCAP, the level of host country development, matters for the 
total affiliate sales, production and platform exports but not for other compositions of those sales. 
The fit of regressions measured by the R2 ranges from 0.47 to 0.68.  
When we look at the panorama of the results in Table 5 there is no evidence that the level 
of FDI is affected by the bilateral tax treaty going into effect. These results then confirm the 
findings of the current literature on the effects of tax treaties on FDI and add to it by using firm 
level data and by exploring the impact of these treaties on the investment and sales behavior of 
the MNE. There is some evidence, however, suggesting that the composition of sales shift in a 
way that reallocate profits to the parent country. 
 
4.3. Export and Import Shares 
To further explore our results from the previous section, we use the share regressions, 
which are a way of controlling for the endogeneity of sales levels. For example, if there is a 
shock that increase both sales and exports proportionally, although this might bias the level 
estimates, it would wash out in the share estimates. This approach thus cleans out omitted 
                                                 
23 We also experimented with different cuts of the data, e.g. by host country development level, by age of the 
affiliate and by region, however, many of the results are not sensible due to the large number of dummy variables 
and the small sample sizes in these sub-samples. Nevertheless, we offer these upon request. 
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affiliate- and firm-specific variables which are not time invariant24. One result of our model is 
that the fall in the value of affiliate exports should be larger than the fall in the value of total 
affiliate sales. Therefore, the ratio of the value of affiliate exports to total affiliate sales should 
decline after a tax treaty is signed if a treaty raises the effective host tax rate. In line with 
Proposition 2, we expect export shares to fall and import shares to rise following the introduction 
of a treaty. 
 Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of the effects of tax treaties on the composition of 
affiliate exports as a share of sales. Columns (1), (3) and (5) look at platform exports/sales while 
columns (2), (4) and (6) consider vertical exports/sales. Even though the platform exports are not 
affected in any significant way by signing tax treaties, vertical exports are. More specifically, 
after the treaty becomes effective the share of exports back to Sweden declines by 78%25. 
Different from the existing literature, here we observe a statistically and economically significant 
effect of tax treaties on the firm behavior, one that is consistent with a treaty increasing the 
effective host tax.    
To explore these results more deeply, we examine whether the treaty effects vary across 
different types of affiliates. To this end, we introduce a new dummy variable PROD which takes 
the value of 1 if the affiliate reports production and zero otherwise. Note that the affiliates 
always report sales in our sample. If we find a significant and positive interaction term 
(TREATY*PROD), it would mean that the export reduction is larger for those affiliates which 
only report sales without giving information on whether or not these sales where assembled by 
the affiliate. If the affiliate exists solely for resale (as might occur if a primary reason for its 
existence is tax avoidance), then this would be suggestive evidence for a reduction in tax evasion 
when the treaty becomes effective. Columns (3) and (4) present the specification with the 
TREATY*PROD interaction. The coefficient of this term although insignificant is negative in the 
vertical export share estimation and positive in the platform export share estimation. In this 
specification, we see no significant effect of tax treaties on the export behavior of the affiliate. 
We continue testing the robustness of this result by introducing an additional dummy 
variable, LOWEXP, which takes the value 1 if the export share of the affiliate is less than 10% 
                                                 
24 Another likely problem with OLS which we have not discussed is the omitted variable problem. Countries which 
switched to tax treaties in our sample period might have switched to other policies which might affect the sales or 
exports of the affiliates. However, if the tax treaty is a part of a movement towards more international ties, one 
would imagine export intensity to rise, not to fall, thus, if anything our results are biased towards zero. 
25 We calculate this magnitude for column (2) of Table 6 by using e-1.496-1=0.775. 
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and 0 otherwise26.  If the primary purpose of an affiliate is to gain access to local consumers, 
then it is possible that changes in the effective host tax affect such a firm’s exports more than one 
highly geared towards international markets, leading to a greater decline in exports relative to 
affiliate sales for the low exporter. Columns (5) and (6) present the specification with this 
TREATY*LOWEXP interaction. Once again we find no significant impact of a treaty on the 
platform share; however, it still has a significant negative effect on the vertical share. 
Furthermore, the decline is greater for firms that export little back to Sweden. If the affiliate’s 
export share is less than 10%, then the decline in the vertical export share is 82%; otherwise it is 
70%.   
Turning to the other controls, it is worth recognizing that although it is not significant, 
TAX carries the theory predicted negative coefficient in every case. Not surprisingly we find that 
the host country market size (GDP) and being established as a sales affiliate (PRODAFF) reduce 
the platform export intensity as would happen if the affiliate exists primarily to serve local 
consumers. Conversely, OPEN positively affects the platform export share, indicating greater 
access to international markets increases the international orientation of affiliate sales. Openness, 
on the other hand, negatively affects the vertical export shares. Platform export shares in scale 
intensive, science based and differentiated goods intensive sectors are also lower than those in 
other sectors. 
Next we turn to our estimates of import shares. Given the results of Proposition 2, here 
we anticipate a positive effect of a tax treaty. Table 7 shows the OLS estimation of the effects of 
tax treaties on the composition of affiliate imports as a share of sales. Columns (1), (3) and (5) 
report the input imports shares whereas columns (2), (4) and (6) report the finished goods 
imports shares. In line with Proposition 2 TREATY increases the import shares; however it is 
only significant for imports of inputs. This is consistent with an attempt to shift profits out of a 
new treaty country. After a tax treaty, our estimates suggest that the Swedish affiliate triples its 
intermediate goods imports from Sweden. This result is matches the significant negative impact 
of TREATY on vertical export shares. Thus, the impact of tax treaties seems to be not on the level 
of affiliate sales, but on the degree of vertical interactions between the parent and the host parts 
of the MNE.  
                                                 
26 We use other benchmark values (20%, 30% and the sample mean) and our results do not change qualitatively.  
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This finding does not vary according to whether or not the affiliate reports production. It 
does, however, seem to be most important for affiliates that import less than 10% of their total 
shares (as in columns (5) and (6) which use a dummy variable LOWIMP which is defined 
analogous to LOWEXP). In fact here we find significantly positive effects for both finished and 
total imports. This finding would be consistent with a setting in which a treaty increases the 
effective host tax, encouraging profit shifting and where the firm is able to adjust its behavior 
with the greatest ease when it is initially importing a small amount relative to its overall 
activities.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presents the first firm-level estimates of the effects of bilateral tax treaties. 
The use of such data allows us to examine not only on the level of FDI but also on the 
probability and the composition of firm activities. This gives us a much broader idea of the 
extent to which tax treaties influence MNE behavior by considering several heretofore 
unexplored aspects of such firms.  
Our results indicate that, given entry, for the most part tax treaties seem to have little 
effect on the level of FDI activity, measured in levels or as shares of affiliate sales. We do, 
however, find that tax treaties increase the probability of a Swedish MNE having an affiliate in a 
given country. Thus, in terms of the level of FDI, the impact of tax treaties seems to be greatest 
along the extensive margin, not the intensive margin. While there is no guarantee that the lessons 
learned from this study of Swedish firms applies universally, our results suggest that the impact 
of treaties might be greatest due to their impact on issues of uncertainty, not by adjusting the 
effective tax rates firms face. This is in fact the argument of Jones (1996).  
We do, however, find an impact of treaties on MNE’s marginal trade decisions. Here, we 
find evidence suggesting that the introduction of a treaty leads the firm to change its trade 
behavior in a way that lowers the profits reported in the host. This would be consistent with the 
idea that a tax treaty raises the effective host tax due to increased information exchange or 
stricter transfer pricing regulations. This result is strongest for trade between the parent and the 
affiliate. Furthermore, we find stronger effects of treaties when affiliates trade small amounts 
relative to the scale of their overall operations. Thus, we hope that our analysis adds insight into 
the debate on tax treaties and the overall behavior of multinational firms.   
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Table 1. Description of the IFN Surveys 
Year Participating 
firms 
Answering 
rate (%) 
Participating 
affiliates  
Answering 
rate (%) 
Total  affiliate 
employment  
1965 108 95 328 82 147292 
1970 108 95 418 100 182087 
1974 108 95 480 100 221111 
1978 122 93 567 100 227149 
1986 108 95 646 99 259823 
1990 120 * 871 91 440879 
1994 132 86 689 97 531994 
1998 118 77 703 71 223061 
* Not available.                 
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Table 2. Countries Signing Tax-Treaties with Sweden During 1965-1998 
Country  Treaty signed 
with Sweden 
 No of firms 
active in 1998 
No affiliates 
active in 1998 
Total affiliate 
employment in 
1998 
Australia 1982 4 7 1154 
Bangladesh 1984 0 0  0 
China 1987 8 14 2849 
Czech Republic 1982 3 3 717 
Estonia 1980 8 9 5636 
Indonesia 1990 * * * 
Kenya 1973 * * * 
Korea, Rep.      1981 * * * 
Latvia      1980 * * * 
Lithuania      1994 * * * 
Luxembourg      1981 * * * 
Malaysia      1968 4 4 915 
Malta      1975 0 0 0 
Mexico      1993 6 8 4718 
Peru      1969 * * * 
Philippines      1970 * * * 
Poland      1974 21 23 3893 
Romania 1978 0 0 0 
Russian Federation      1980 4 4 462 
Singapore      1967 3 4 222 
Slovak Republic      1982 * * * 
Spain            1975 9 15 4593 
Sri Lanka      1985 * * * 
Turkey      1991 * * * 
Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 1982 * * * 
Zambia        1976 * * * 
Zimbabwe      1990 * * * 
Number of   
firms/affiliates/employed 
 42 114 30190 
 * Information suppressed when there are less than three firms due to confidentiality reasons 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics (level and share regressions) 
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
      
TREATY 473 0.688 0.463      0 1 
TAX 473 35.780 5.77 25 60 
GDP (log) 559 19.265 1.264 14.999 22.124 
GDPCAP (log) 559 9.078 0.657 6.755 10.589 
OPEN (log) 559 3.707 0.730 2.572 5.818 
AGE 533 11,911 14.073 0 71 
R&D (log) 547 -3.990 1.337 -9.210 -1.336 
EXPERIENCE 568 0.948 0.241  0 1 
FSIZE (log) 568 8.866 2.081 2.297 12.314 
SCALE (log) 568 6.318 0.351 5.739 7.531 
PRODAFF 526 0.785 0.411 0 1 
Total Sales (log) 566 3.735 1.756 -1.291 8.636 
Production (log) 473 3.305 1.814 -6.908 7.730 
Resale (log) 256 2.502 2.230 -5.116 7.687 
Local Sales (log) 495 3.554 1.823 -3.163 8.626 
Platform Exports (log) 254 2.078 2.497 -4.711 6.786 
Vertical Exports (log) 154 1.105 1.997 -5.809 5.808 
Input Imports (log) 249 1.338 2.357 -6.908 6.701 
Finished Imports (log) 194 1.088 2.370 -5.298 7.112 
Vertical Export Share (log) 154 -3.078 2.149 -8.769 0 
Platform Export Share (log) 254 -2.373 1.877 -9.239 0.042 
Input Import Share (log) 249 2.363 1.358 -7.601 0.361 
Finished Import Share (log) 194 -2.830 1.707 -10.108 0.053 
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Table 4. Probit Estimates of Treaty Effects on New Entry by Swedish Multinationals: 
Alternative Specifications 
  
 Dependent Variable: Entry versus No-Entry 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Country FE Firm FE Industry FE 
    
TREATY 0.395** 
(0.191) 
0.747* 
(0.419) 
0.652*** 
(0.214) 
TAX 0.005 
(0.021) 
0.009 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.021) 
    
GDP 0.405** 
(0.190) 
3.952** 
(1.663) 
0.021** 
(0.200) 
GDPCAP 0.165 
(0.292) 
-2.607 
(1.673) 
0.420 
(0.324) 
OPEN -0.007 
(0.266) 
0.081 
(0.425) 
-0.185 
(0.338) 
R&D -0.055 
(0.043) 
  -0.105**  
(0.051) 
-0.016 
(0.071) 
EXPERIENCE 2.251*** 
(0.178) 
2.499*** 
(0.236) 
2.608*** 
(0.228) 
FSIZE 0.072** 
(0.032) 
0.226**  
(0.172) 
0.017 
(0.080) 
SCALE -0.019 
(0.151) 
0.691 
(0.306) 
0.160 
(0.184) 
Labor Intensive -0.309** 
(0.135) 
7.772*** 
(0.646) 
 
Scale Intensive -0.065 
(0.149) 
8.145*** 
(0.539) 
 
Differentiated Goods -0.179 
(0.149) 
8.304*** 
(0.982) 
 
Science Based -0.227 
(0.231) 
-1.003 
(0.908) 
 
Intercept -11.726*** 
(3.446) 
-43.877*** 
(13.212) 
 
    
    
Pseudo R2 0.487 0.508 0.537 
Observations  11,048 3,235 5.578 
    
Note: All regressions include country, RTA, and year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5. OLS Estimates of Treaty Effects on the Level of Sales, Exports and Imports of Swedish Affiliates 
  
 Dependent Variable 
 Total Sales Composition of Sales Composition of Sales Composition of Exports Total Imports Composition of Imports 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Production Resale Local Sales Total Exports Platform Vertical  Input Finished 
Variables           
           
TREATY -0.125 
(0.241) 
-0.473 
(0.498) 
0.497 
(0.898) 
0.526 
(0.346) 
-2.244 
(1.359) 
-1.631 
(1.735) 
-1.076* 
(0.513) 
2.291*** 
(0.497) 
0.419 
(1.025) 
0.285 
(1.126) 
TAX -0.014 
(0.023) 
0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
0.022 
(0.028) 
-0.053 
(0.040) 
-0.072 
(0.060) 
-0.124 
(0.084) 
-0.006 
(0.033) 
-0.029 
(0.029) 
-0.005 
(0.040) 
GDP -2.364 
(1.531)  
-1.687 
(2.008) 
-4.447 
(3.366) 
0.811 
(1.778) 
-10.615** 
(4.391) 
-13.185** 
(4.648) 
-8.317 
(6.483) 
1.702 
(3.910) 
2.162 
(2.908) 
0.362 
(5.679) 
GDPCAP 3.490** 
(1.303) 
3.070* 
(1.784) 
5.779** 
(2.678) 
0.429 
(1.797) 
7.409* 
(3.739) 
11.936*** 
(4.089) 
5.849 
(5.781) 
0.856 
(3.922) 
-2.516 
(4.157) 
-2.188 
(4.863) 
OPEN -0.046 
0.385) 
-0.751 
(0.517) 
-0.504 
(0.906) 
0.340 
(0.545) 
-0.020 
(0.616) 
1.778* 
(0.872) 
-3.273*** 
(0.924) 
-0.444 
(1.008) 
0.380 
(2.112) 
0.747 
(1.567) 
R&D -0.065 
(0.065)  
-0.117 
(0.089) 
0.276 
(0.167) 
-0.014 
(0.068) 
-0.156 
(0.099) 
-0.145 
(0.100) 
-0.099 
(0.086) 
0.314 
(0.187) 
0.069 
(0.098) 
0.695*** 
(0.189) 
EXPERIENCE -0.344 
(0.289) 
-0.635* 
(0.327) 
-1.015 
(1.185) 
-0.432 
(0.377) 
0.053 
(0.295) 
0.169 
(0.333) 
0.119 
(0.512) 
-1.106*** 
(0.344) 
-1.069** 
(0.441) 
-0.283 
(1.285) 
AGE 0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.027*** 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.028*** 
(0.006) 
0.022*** 
(0.005) 
0.028 
0.017) 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
FSIZE 0.419*** 
(0.033) 
0.425*** 
(0.049) 
0.423*** 
(0.117) 
0.451*** 
(0.061) 
0.294*** 
(0.073) 
0.410*** 
(0.117) 
0.219** 
(0.094) 
0.322*** 
(0.067) 
0.336** 
(0.139) 
0.218 
(0.194) 
PRODAFF 0.854*** 
(0.264) 
0.298 
(0.276) 
1.979*** 
(0.273) 
1.057*** 
(0.272) 
-0.334 
(0.551) 
-0.267 
(0.359) 
0.505 
(0.611) 
1.666*** 
(0.428) 
0.853** 
(0.393) 
1.712** 
(0.773) 
Intercept 14.761 
(19.588) 
4.555 
(24.038 
34.789 
(47.224) 
-22.920 
(21.079) 
142.098** 
(55.976) 
133.246** 
(58.236) 
123.702 
(79.620) 
-41.937 
(47.221) 
-21.666 
(32.088) 
10.975 
(75.814) 
           
           
R2 0.654 0.594 0.620 0.626 0.495 0.515 0.466 0.577 0.678 0.544 
Observations  412 367 197 363 237 198 127 270 187 146 
           
Note: All regressions include country, RTA, and year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Effects on Tax Treaties on the Composition of Affiliate Exports as a Share of 
Sales: Alternative Specifications 
  
 Dependent Variable 
 All Affiliates Production Reporting Low Export 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Platform/ 
Sales 
Vertical/ 
Sales 
Platform/ 
Sales 
Vertical/ 
Sales 
Platform/ 
Sales 
Vertical/ 
Sales 
       
       
TREATY -1.530 
(1.700) 
-1.496** 
(0.517) 
-4.026 
(2.448) 
-0.329 
(0.692) 
-1.024 
(0.976) 
-1.202*** 
(0.379) 
TAX -0.043 
(0.048) 
-0.039 
(0.075) 
-0.071 
(0.044) 
-0.016 
(0.090) 
-0.027 
(0.036) 
-0.0009 
(0.047) 
PROD   -1.607 
(1.441) 
1.051* 
(0.578) 
  
TREATY * PROD   2.322 
(1.424) 
-0.583 
(0.434) 
  
LOWEXP     -2.878*** 
(0.483) 
-2.592*** 
(0.194) 
TREATY * LOWEXP     0.672 
(0.473) 
-0.510** 
(0.178) 
       
GDP -10.504*** 
(3.270) 
-4.448 
(4.459) 
-13.649*** 
(3.434) 
-.073 
(6.127) 
-5.291* 
(3.009) 
3.766 
(2.547) 
GDPCAP 8.717*** 
(2.774) 
2.528 
(4.207) 
11.677*** 
(3.511) 
-1.694 
(5.666) 
4.630** 
(2.207) 
-4.018 
(2.376) 
OPEN 1.783*** 
(0.556) 
-3.229*** 
(0.839) 
1.305* 
(0.766) 
-2.675** 
(1.089) 
0.238 
(0.466) 
-2.049** 
(0.900) 
R&D -0.058 
(0.099) 
0.164 
(0.118) 
-0.066 
(0.091) 
0.169 
(0.126) 
0.016 
(0.080) 
0.206 
(0.138) 
EXPERIENCE 0.711 
(0.433) 
-0.024* 
(0.389) 
0.708 
(0.417) 
-0.067 
(0.461) 
0.685*** 
(0.182) 
-0.192 
(0.342) 
AGE -0.017 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(-0.005) 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
FSIZE -0.021 
(0.114) 
-0.343*** 
(0.098) 
-0.017 
(0.113) 
-0.332*** 
(0.103) 
0.007 
(0.029) 
-0.105* 
(-0.056) 
PRODAFF -0.961*** 
(0.265) 
   0.057 
(0.394) 
-0.869*** 
  (0.232) 
0.002 
(0.451) 
-0.257* 
(0.137) 
 0 .631** 
(0.207) 
Labor Intensive -0.899 
(0.542) 
-0.535 
(0.299) 
-0.881* 
(0.526) 
-0.520* 
(0.279) 
-0.446** 
(0.208) 
-0.603** 
(0.169) 
Scale Intensive -0.878* 
(0.469) 
  0.202 
(0.889) 
-0.835* 
(0.452) 
0.131 
 (0.935) 
-0.433* 
(0.217) 
-0.175 
(0.394) 
Differentiated Goods -0.755** 
(0.247) 
-0.113 
(0.537) 
-0.698*** 
(0.228) 
-0.109 
  (0.521) 
-0.436** 
(0.147) 
-0.319 
(0.266) 
Science Based -1.335** 
(0.454) 
  0.311 
(0.678) 
-1.239*** 
(0.404) 
0.436 
(0.571) 
-0.637 
(0.459) 
  0.102 
(0.355) 
Intercept 111.919* 
(39.563) 
  79.854 
(52.837) 
148.559*** 
(39.725) 
42.882 
(72.487) 
55.735 
(41.178) 
  -23.998 
(29.828) 
       
R2 0.484 0.629 0.501 0.633 0.734 0.812 
Observations 198 127 198 127 198 127 
       
Note: All regressions include country, RTA, and year dummies. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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Table 7. Effects on Tax Treaties on the Composition of Affiliate Imports as a Share 
of Sales: Alternative Specifications 
  
 Dependent Variable 
 All Affiliates Production Reporting Low Import 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Input/ 
Sales 
Finished/ 
Sales 
Input/ 
Sales 
Finished/
Sales 
Input/ 
Sales 
Finished/ 
Sales 
       
       
TREATY 0.968** 
(0.386) 
0.449 
(0.812) 
1.797* 
(0.893) 
1.354 
(1.301) 
-0.516 
(0.889) 
0.251 
(0.984) 
TAX -0.027 
(0.038) 
-0.034 
(0.044) 
-0.023 
(0.038) 
-0.017 
(0.050) 
-0.018 
(0.036) 
-0.061 
(0.036) 
PROD  
 
 -0.259 
(0.775) 
2.023** 
(0.691) 
  
TREATY * PROD  
 
 -1.145 
(0.949) 
-0.821 
(1.214) 
  
LOWIMP  
 
   -3.648*** 
(0.601) 
-2.475*** 
(0.255) 
TREATY * LOWIMP  
 
   1.223* 
(0.665) 
0.617* 
(0.343) 
       
GDP 3.671 
(3.764) 
-0.500 
(4.223) 
3.196 
(4.479) 
3.052 
(4.934) 
-2.662 
(3.019) 
-1.249 
(4.551) 
GDPCAP -5.402 
(5.024) 
-1.531 
(3.802) 
-5.365 
(5.627) 
-5.593 
(4.079) 
0.797 
(3.600) 
1.516 
(4.429) 
OPEN 0.529 
(1.205) 
1.061 
(1.288) 
0.819 
(1.416) 
2.041 
(1.181) 
0.880 
(0.969) 
-0.281 
(1.449) 
R&D -0.041 
(0.162) 
0.586*** 
(0.174) 
-0.038 
(0.159) 
0.572*** 
(0.175) 
0.157 
(0.097) 
0.202 
(0.184) 
EXPERIENCE -1.522* 
(0.862) 
-0.711 
(0.419) 
-1.574* 
(0.829) 
-0.731* 
(0.411) 
-1.108* 
(0.565) 
-0.077 
(0.554) 
AGE -0.023 
(0.016) 
-0.0007 
(0.009) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
FSIZE -0.163 
(0.102) 
-0.192** 
(0.072) 
-0.179 
(0.107) 
-0.177** 
(0.084) 
-0.208** 
(0.083) 
-0.083 
(0.089) 
PRODAFF -0.896*** 
(0.284) 
0.712* 
(0.371) 
-0.874*** 
(0.282) 
0.678*  
(0.365) 
-0.718* 
(0.371) 
-0.008 
(0.276) 
Labor Intensive 1.418 
 (1.114) 
2.132** 
(0.543) 
1.411 
(0.945) 
2.086*** 
(0.488) 
  0.741 
(0.927) 
1.013* 
(0.548) 
Scale Intensive 1.215 
(0.921) 
0.941* 
(0.344) 
1.249 
(0.810) 
0.939**  
(0.392) 
0.631 
(0.625) 
0.332 
(0.459) 
Differentiated Goods 0.835 
(0.811) 
0.971** 
(0.185) 
0.873 
(0.686) 
1.015***  
(0.248) 
0.617 
(0.594) 
0.614*** 
(0.199) 
Science Based 1.279 
(1.122) 
0.602 
(0.801) 
1.119 
(1.056) 
0.749  
(0.881) 
0.292 
(0.879) 
0.553 
(0.766) 
Intercept -23.641 
(30.498) 
21.298 
(52.296) 
-15.798 
(39.800) 
-16.601 
(63.342) 
42.249 
(30.319) 
12.399 
(53.522) 
       
R2 0.676 0.413 0.683 0.449 0.796 0.635 
Observations 187 146 187 146 187 146 
       
Note: All regressions include country, RTA, and year include region and time dummies. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
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